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THE LEGAL BASIS OF EXTRATERRITORIAL
ZONING IN OKLAHOMA
JmmY L. GooD1~N*

INTRODUCTION
The concept of a municipal corporation as the incorporation of a territory with definitely prescribed boundaries
is often the frame of reference first employed by the lawyer
analyzing a problem involving a municipality's exercise of
its powers. Interestingly, a different concept of a municipal
corporation prevailed at early common law. At that time a
city was regarded as a community of interests having no
detailed geographical boundaries. Had this early concept
of a municipal corporation continued in the law, the subject
of extraterritorial powers of cities would be moot. As the
metropolitan area grew, the jurisdiction of the city to police
and zone its peripheral area would automatically have followed. The short life and early death of this early common
law concept are underscored, however, by the fact that the
thought of a municipal corporation exercising police and
zoning powers outside its "city limits" is usually foreign to
the reasoning processes of the present-day legal practitioner.
Nevertheless, the practitioner's emphasis on the geographical limits of the municipality's exercise of its powers
fails to take into account the fact that the ability of a municipal corporation to effectively govern is often impeded by
its inability to govern matters immediately outside its boundaries. As one author has stated:
The fact that municipal corporations possess prescribed boundaries results in many of the metropolitan
area problems. Germs do not stop at corporate limits.
*B.A. 1961, University of Tulsa; LL.B. 1964, Georgetown University Law Center. Mx. Goodman is presently Assistant City
Attorney, Tulsa, Oklahoma.
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Vice, protected by inadequate police supervision in the
outlying area, will infest the core city ....3
Moreover, the rapid spread of urban development in and
around large cities further emphasizes the fact that the political city seldom, if ever, corresponds with the physical city.
EXTRATERRoIAL.EXERCISE OF THE POLICE POWER IN GENERAL

In response to the above problems, the legislative delegation of extraterritorial police powers to cities has been
utilized as a mechanic for mitigating the severe effects of
the principle that a municipal corporation has prescribed
boundaries. Thus, the general rule is:
The Legislature has power to confer on a municipal
corporation police jurisdiction over adjoining territory
immediately next to and within a specified distance
of the corporate limits. There is no violation of the
fundamental law in a statute or charter provision under
which some of the police regulations of a municipality
extend beyond its territorial limits .... 2
Since the power to zone is unquestionably an attribute
of the police power,3 an examination of the cases involving
extraterritorial exercise of municipalities' police power will
serve to show that the modern extraterritorial exercise of
the zoning power is firmly bottomed on principles long
established in the common law of this country.
"Cases involving questions of the municipalities' exercise of the police power are many and varied. ' 4 They can
usually be classified as to whether the particular ordinance
involved affected the territory outside the corporate limits
either incidentally or directly.
1

Sengstock, ExtraterritorialPowers in the Metropolitan Area,
p. 3, (Michigan Legal Publications, 1962).
237 Aa . JuR. Municipal Corporations,§ 284, (1941).
3
Yoldey, Zoning Law and Practice, §1-1, p. 1, (3rd ed. 1965).
4
3Bartelt, ExtraterritorialZoning: Reflections On Its Validity,
32 NoTRE DAmm LAw. 367, 386 (1957).
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Territories are incidentally affected when activities carried on therein are subject to the regulations of a municipality as a condition to the exercise of a right or privilege.
Such cases usually involve ordinances requiring the inspection or licensing of businesses located beyond the city limits,
but marketing their products within the city. With respect
to this category of cases, suffice it to say that the courts
sustained the validity of such ordihave overwhelmingly
5
nances.
Municipalities directly affect noncorporate territories
when their ordinances operate within such territories independently of the exercise of rights or privileges within the
corporate limits. Since the concept of extraterritorial zoning
means the application of municipal zoning ordinances to noncorporate territory, it therefore involves a direct exercise
of the police power.
Consequently, this article will be confined to an analysis
of those cases involving a direct exercise of the police power
in noncorporate territory.
Cities are frequently given authority to enact health
ordinances having extraterritorial effect and Oklahoma municipalities are no exception. Municipalities are given the
power to make regulations designed to prevent the introduction of contagious diseases within their borders by enacting and enforcing guarantine ordinances with respect to
areas within five miles of their borders.6
Oklahoma municipalities are likewise given authority to
enact ordinances having extraterritorial effect for the pro-

tection of their water supplies located outside the city limits.7

Lakeview v. Davidson' involved the validity of such an
ordinance. The defendant attacked the validity of an Okla5Id. at 387.
§ 666 (1961).
§§ 292-94 (1961).
8166 Okla. 171, 26 P.2d 760 (1933).

6 OKLA. STAT. tit. 11
7 OKLA. STAT. tit. 11
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homa City ordinance requiring all boats operating on Lake
Overholser, the municipal water supply located considerably beyond the city limits, to be equipped with one life preserver for each passenger. It was contended that the ordinance was invalid because ".... said lake is located beyond
the territorial limits of said city and the city does not possess the9 power to give extraterritorial effect to its police
power.
In upholding the validity of this ordinance the Supreme
Court of Oklahoma stated as follows:
It is true that ordinances of municipality do not extend beyond the geographical limits of the municipality
unless a specific grant of power to enact such ordinances
is granted by the laws of the State.
Section 6070, O.S. 1931, grants such authority. After
providing for acquisition of land within or without the
corporate limits of such municipality for waterworks
purposes, provision is made by the statute for policing
the same....
Thus we find a specific grant of authority to sustain
the ordinance in question.'0
In Lakceview, the Court's only concern was with the presence or absence of the necessary legislative authority for the
city to exercise police power over the extraterritorial water
supply.
After pointing out that an enabling statute, almost identical to that of Oklahoma, empowered Utah cities to construct
waterworks without their limits and protect the water supply from pollution, the Supreme Court of Utah matter-offactly sustained the validity of a Salt Lake City ordinance
prohibiting the keeping of horses, pigs, cattle and other animals near a stream for ten miles above the place where the
water was taken for municipal drinking purposes." This
case is especially relevant to the subject of the extraterri9

d. at 176, 26 P. 2d at 765 (1933).

10 Ibid.

" Salt Lake City v. Young, 45 Utah 349, 145 Pac. 1047 (1915).
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torial zoning power of a city when one realizes that by its
holding the court restricted the use the defendant could
make of the property through which the stream ran by compelling him to keep his livestock from the stream.
In City of West Frankfortv. FolIop, :2 the municipal corporation enacted an ordinance prohibiting oil and gas operations from around its municipal water supply located some
eight miles beyond the city limits. The trial court refused
to enjoin the defendants from drilling or operating oil and
gas wells on sites seven miles from the city and approximately one and one-half miles from the water supply. On
appeal the Supreme Court of Illinois reversed the trial court
decision, after emphasizing that the ordinance had been enacted pursuant to enabling legislation passed by the Illinois
Legislature. In upholding the ordinance the Illinois court
held that while cities have no jurisdiction outside their
boundaries, the legislature may confer such power and
when granted it is effective extraterritorially.
Jourdan v. City of Evansville'3 involved the extraterritorial regulation of the sale of alcoholic beverages. The
court readily acknowledged the power of the legislature to
determine the boundaries of the jurisdiction of municipalities and stated that once the determination is made by the
legislature the latter's judgment is conclusive on the courts.
State v. Rice' sustained the constitutionality of the power of the City of Greensboro to exercise its police power beyond the corporate limits. The ordinance under attack made
it unlawful to keep pigs within the city limits and for a
quarter mile beyond. After determining that the legislature
had given the city jurisdiction to exercise police power
within one mile of its city limits in all directions, the court
unequivocally upheld the ordinance in the following languIll. App. 2d 609, 129 N.E.2d 682 (1955).
18163 Ind.App. 512, 72 N.E. 544 (1904).
126

14158

N.C. 635, 74 S.E. 582 (1912).
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age: "The Legislature has unquestioned authority to confer upon the town authorities jurisdiction for sanitary or
police purposes of territory beyond the city limits."1 r
However, the light of Malone v. Williams,' an earlier
case, cast a shadow of doubt upon the unequivocal statement
made in the Rice case. Under attack in Malone was the
constitutionality of a Tennessee Act authorizing Memphis
to ".

.

. have and exercise within the city limits, and for

two miles outside thereof, all governmental powers and police powers. . . ."" The Tennessee Supreme Court conceded

it to be within the power of the Legislature to authorize
subordinate corporations to pass ordinances or laws having
restricted effect beyond their limits.
This reluctant acceptance of limited extensions of municipal police power over noncorporate territory was restricted, however, by the following language:
...

but even this is hard to justify on any principle

other than that the municipality is in such matters the
agent of the state itself for the protection of the people
of the state. But that agency cannot be used as a basis
for conferring power upon municipalities over territory
outside of them any further than bare necessity requires. Certain it is there can be no justification for extending over and outside strip of country, two miles in
width, or of any less width, all the governmental powers
of the city, or even all of the police powers of the city.18
The crux of the arguments opposing the exercise of
police powers by municipalities over noncorporate territories is that the grant to municipalities of such powers
creates government without the consent of the governed.
Thus, the Court succinctly stated in the Malone case:
The control in the present instance is given, not to
anyone chosen or elected by the [extraterritorial] people ...
'r
'

but to the officers of a foreign body, chosen for

Ibid.

118 Tenn. App. 390, 103 S.W. 789 (1907).
Tenn. Acts 1907, ch. 184, art. I, § 3, at 565.
18 Supra note 16, at, 103 S.W. at 806.

17
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the service of that body, and not for the people to be
affected by the powers given.... But upon the general
question we do not hesitate to say that the Legislature
has no more power . . . to impose burdens upon the
citizen in favor of a municipal corporation of which he'
is not a member than it has to impose burdens upon
him in behalf of another man who has rendered to him
no equivalent. 19
The same argument was utilized in a Kentucky case,
Smeltzer v. Messer,20 which held that an attempt to zone
noncorporate territory was beyond the purview of the zoning statutes. In the course of its opinion, the court declared;
The above principles [municipal powers terminating at
corporate boundaries) are significant in this case because the city's action, if sustained, seriously impairs
the rights of a person owning property beyond its limits
who has no voice in its legislative policies, and who receives no legally recognizable
21 benefit to such property
from the city government.
It is submitted that the so-called lack of consent of the
governed argument propounded in the Malone and Smettzer
cases is invalid. Extraterritorial powers are exercised by
the municipality pursuant to a delegation of authority by
the state legislature. Thus, those beyond the city limits
have actually consented to the extraterritorial exercise of
these municipal powers through their representatives in' the
state legislature. That this is so is implicit in the Malone
case where the court stated that if the power to govern,
extraterritorially which had been specially given to Memphis
had been generally given to other cities and towns of the
state, ".... such general legislation would immediately produce an uprising which would insure its repeal."22 Thus, the.
court itself acknowledges that if the legislature were to
generally confer extraterritorial jurisdiction on all the mu
nicipalities of Tennessee, the extraterritorial citizens would
9
Ibid.
20 311 Ky. 692, 225 S.W.2d 96 (1949).
21
, 225 S.W.2d at 97.
1d at, 103 S.W. at 806.
22 Supra note 16, at-
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rise up to elect representatives to the legislature who would
insure the repeal of such legislation. Consequently, it is
seen that the lack of consent of the governed argument when
analyzed proves invalid as a reason for opposing the extraterritorial exercise of power by municipalities.
EXTRATERRITORIAL EXERCISE
OF THE ZONING POWER
At the time he wrote his monumental article, "Extraterritorial Zoning: Reflections On Its Validity," Professor Louis
F. Bartelt, Jr., Valparaiso University, stated that there were
no cases which directly answered the question of the validity
of extraterritorial zoning. This statement was made with
full knowledge of Smeltzer which Professor Bartelt dismissed in the following language:
In Smeltzer v. Messer, the issue of fringe zoning was
squarely before the Kentucky appellate court. Through
strategic maneuvers, the court managed a successful
outflanking operation, emerged unscathed, and decided
almost nothing. The fringe, over which the city attempted to exert its zoning powers (with statutory authorization), included lands situated in two adjoining
counties. Inasmuch as it had been decided in an earlier
case that cities could not annex in other counties, the
court felt that its use was not so reasonably reZated to
the city's development as to fal within the purview of
of the statutes.2
Regarding the vacuum of authority pertaining to the
validity of extraterritorial zoning, Professor Bartelt went
on to state that "tlhe writer believes that this situation
will be short-lived. The rumblings emanating from the
hinterlands indicate the approach of an irresistible force to
an immovable object. The collision will soon echo in appellate courts."' The prophetic insight of this statement has
proven to be true.
The case of Morand v. City of Raleigh25 found the Supreme Court of North Carolina taking a view toward the
224 Supra note 4, at 397-98 (Footnotes omitted).
Supra note 4, at 375, footnote 25.
21 247 N.C. 363, 100 S.E.2d 870 (1957).

https://digitalcommons.law.utulsa.edu/tlr/vol4/iss1/3

8

Goodman: The Legal Basis of Extraterritorial Zoning in Oklahoma

19671

EXTRATERRITORIAL ZONING

".... ultimate fate of extraterritorial zoning"2' 6 hinted at in
its earlier State v. Owen27 decision. The Owen case had

involved the single question whether the Winston-Salem
extraterritorial zoning ordinance was supported by enabling legislation adequate to make it enforceable outside the
city limits. The court held that the ordinance, originally
invalid because enacted without statutory authority, was
not automatically activated by the subsequent enabling
amendment.
In confining itself to the statement that a municipal ordinance invalid under an enabling act existing at the time
of its enactment is not validated by mere amendment of
the statute, so that an ordinance might be validly enacted, the court may have been implying that it would
with authorized extraterritorial zoning
deal charitably
28
ordinances.
In Morand, the North Carolina Supreme Court was finally
confronted head-on with the constitutionality of the extraterritorial zoning power delegated to cities by the enabling
legislation adopted subsequent to the enactment of WinstonSalem's extraterritorial zoning ordinance. Pursuant to this
statute, Raleigh adopted an ordinance zoning an area one
mile beyond its corporate limits for residential use. Morand
and his wife operated a trailer camp just beyond the city
limits but within the one-mile perimeter which the city enjoined. On appeal, the Morands contended that since their
property was outside the city limits in an area neither subjected to city taxes nor inhabited by residents of Raleigh,
the latter's extraterritorial zoning ordinance was therefore
unreasonable and arbitrary. In short answer to this contention, the North Carolina court significantly reiterated
its unequivocal language in Rice that: "The Legislature has
unquestioned authority to confer upon the town authorities jurisdiction for sanitary or police purposes of territory
26

Supra note 4, at 393.

27 242 N.C. 525, 88 S.E.2nd 832 (1955).
28
Supranote 4, at 394.
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beyond the city limits."2 9 Continuing in Morand, the court
stated:
We hold that the ordinance under consideration,
which prohibits the construction and maintenance of a
trailer camp within areas zoned for residential purposes
within the City of Raleigh and within one mile of its
corporate limits, is a valid exercise of the police power
and may be enforced by injunctive relief.30
Moreover, the only argument seriously made against
extraterritorial jurisdiction, the so-called lack of consent
of the governed argument, has been clearly confronted and
disposed of in the recent case of Schlientz v. City of North
Platte.3 Here, the plaintiff, Schlientz, sought to enjoin the
City of North Platte, Nebraska from enforcing its extraterritorial zoning ordinance on the theory that the ordinance and the enabling legislation pursuant to which it was
adopted were both unconstitutional. In support of this theory, Schlientz stated the lack of consent of the governed
argument in its most precipitate form:
the persons lying in the area adjacent to and 1 mile
beyond the corporate limits of the city have no voice in
the selection of elective officers and officials of the city,
which amounts to a disfranchisement of such persons
because they are subjected to the jurisdiction of elected
officers and officials whom they had no voice in choosing, and, therefore Section 16-901, R.S. Supp., 1959,2 is
unconstitutional, and ordinance No. 922 is invalid.
...

The court succinctly disposed of this argument as follows:
Such persons as heretofore mentioned [those living
in the area adjacent to and one mile beyond the corporate limits] have neither a constitutional nor inherent
right to local self-government. The Legislature may subject them to the jurisdiction of officers for whom they
have no voice in the selection. This does not constitute
a violation of any constitutional provision. 83
29

Supra note 14.

80 Supranote 25 at-,
100 S.E.2d at 874.
831172 Neb. 447, 110 N.W.2d 58 (1961).
2Id. at 66.

33 Id. at 66-67.
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Thus, it is seen that what one author has described as
" . the most cogent objection to extraterritorial zoning ....M4 has been judicially overruled.

CONCLUSION
The legality of extraterritorial zoning by municipal corporations is now established as a general proposition of law.
The theoretical basis of the proposition lies in the principle
that the legislature of a state can delegate to municipal corcorporations the power to zone property beyond their corporate boundaries. The widespread judicial acceptance of this
theory has led one author to conclude that municipalities
may operate beyond their limits without restriction if the
state legislatures grant such authority.2
Thus, the delegation of power by the Oklahoma Legisattre to cities in excess of 180,000 population to zone an
area five miles from their corporate limits is in strict accord with long established principles of law. 6

3

Sengstock, supra note 1, at 64.
85 Bouwsma, The Validity of ExtraterritorialZoning, 8 VA=. L.
REv. 806, 811 (1955).

8 OiLA. STAT. tit. 19 §§ 863.1-86343 (1961) as amended by
OxLA. STAT. tit. 19 §§ 863.2-863.27 (Supp. 1963) and OXK.A.
STAT. tit. 19 §§ 863.44-863.48 (Supp. 1965).
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